in effect assessing whether children's 'voices' can be taken seriously, and at what age this might be possible.
Communication of adult professionals with children has typically been guided by developmental theories on children's skills at certain ages. However, in recent years, challenging the hegemony of developmental approaches, sociologists of childhood have promoted an alternative perspective to children's competencies, arguing, for example, that where children are the subjects of professional and judicial activity focused on welfare needs, children's rights are eroded by assumptions about their lack of cognitive, emotional and experiential competence to make decisions in their own best interests (Parton and Wattam, 1999) . In this way, children are too often denied 'agency' and subjecthood in society because they are deemed vulnerable and incompetent. This approach argues that children are not only shaped by society but also shape it (Prout, 2000) in their own ways.
Scholars have made varied attempts to acknowledge children's agency, for instance, through research strategies that involve participating in children's culture. In the early literature of this kind (Corsaro and Streeck, 1986) , entering directly into children's worlds was recommended as a way of establishing how the development of children's 'social competence' is embedded in social contexts. Subsequent studies of 'children's cultures' have investigated the ways in which children acquire, use and refine social knowledge and discourse skills in their everyday interactions with peers and adults and in the communicative procedures through which they structure the interpersonal world around them. This has been achieved either through direct observation or through micro-ethnographies conducted in institutions (Hutchby and Moran-Ellis, 1998) .
In addition, some writers have promoted a phenomenological research approach that may facilitate access into 'children's worlds', including the worlds of young and/or disabled children with little or no speech. This involves detailed in-depth observations and prolonged interaction where the child 'allows' the adult to take part, or the child leads (Goode, 1991) . This kind of approach has also involved the ethical aim of promoting equality in research relationships, and to give children a 'voice'.
More recently, the 'voice' of the disabled child has increasingly been included in the literature (Beresford, 1997; Middleton, 1999) . For example, Morris (1999) notes widespread assumptions that disabled children lack the skills not only to act in their own best interests, but also to make their views known in a comprehensible way. These discussions about 'opening up communication channels' between disabled children (including those with little or no speech) and their carers seek to give children choices allowing them to exert some control over their lives.
My research project on young children's 'communication difficulties' hoped to marry the aforementioned issues, in many ways overlapping practical, ethical and social research concerns. It started off from the assertion that disabled children's 'voices' are marginal in society (Morris, 1999) and that adults ought to seek and allow for novel ways for 'bridging the communication gap' (Middleton, 1999) . According to contemporary guidelines for ethically sound research conduct, the inclusion of disabled children in sociological investigation as subjects rather than objects seemed at first to be a sound ethical pursuit, even though there may be significant barriers to communication due to a profound impairment. In short, researchers and practitioners should not assume that even young disabled children with little or no speech 'have nothing to say' (Beresford, 1997) .
However, my actual research experience in special needs settings led me to take a different route in considering the ethics and practice of research in this context. I came to see that there are fundamental ambiguities in the understanding of 'normal' communication. I identified a moral-pragmatic tension at the heart of the so-called 'child-centred' debates, including social research: young children (with or without communication difficulties) are typically positioned as both dependent, vulnerable receivers of care and education, and sometimes 'agentic' subjects with distinct 'voices' (Hutchby and Moran-Ellis, 1998; Middleton, 1999; Morris, 1999) . I suggest this ambiguity applies to both disabled and able-bodied children. Furthermore, I have observed particular understandings of the concept of 'voice', typically as a relatively straightforward mental, verbal and rational property of the individual (e.g. Finnegan, 2002) .
In the course of the research process, I found that a sociological deconstruction of children's 'voices' became necessary so that the notion of 'voice' is understood as a multidimensional social construction, which is subject to change. At the same time, 'voices' manifest discourses, practices and contexts in which they occur. I argue that what is 'true' and 'real' about voices remains an unresolved puzzle since, as Bakhtin (Emerson and Holquist, 1986) argues, 'voices' are always social. The notion of 'listening to children's voices' may be a good starting point for a social study of children's lives. Nevertheless, it makes it -particularly in light of current recommendations of ethical research conduct (e.g. Alderson, 1995 ) -a challenging task. Hence, this article aims to describe how this is the case, and suggest strategies for epistemologically and ethically sound research conduct.
With these issues as a starting point, I now discuss what can be learned about adult-child communication in specific institutional contexts for social research purposes. In this respect, Durham Peters's (1999) question -'how do we know that we have really communicated?' -proves useful. Before we can simply 'give a voice' to children, we need to acknowledge that there are ambiguities involved in human communication, and that these ambiguities result from the 'socialness' of human interaction, discourses and practices.
The research project
This article draws on a research project that was carried out in England between 2000 and 2004. The initial idea of the project was to explore the ways in which children's 'voices' were (if they were at all) taken into account within professional practice, and how the child was positioned as a communicator in multidisciplinary specialist settings. Drawing on social constructionist perspectives, the original research design sought to develop novel sociological understandings of young children's 'communication difficulties' and thereby contribute to both child welfare practice (including child protection), childhood sociology and theories of disability. The research began with the working hypothesis that in professional settings, young disabled children's 'voices' may be in danger of remaining marginal. Hence, the project aimed to describe how children's communication and communication difficulties were understood and acted towards in the everyday practices of child welfare specialists.
I conducted ethnographic research in two settings, where I observed interaction among and between young children and adult professionals. The first setting was a day nursery (the 'Children's Centre'), where disabled children were receiving additional support and education in a therapeutic environment. In the second, 'Team Service', setting, a multidisciplinary team of practitioners assessed children's communication and other health, welfare or educational needs. Although entirely different settings, the practices in both were based on clinical and therapeutic knowledges of children with special needs. The two settings operated in the framework of current legal and ethical guidelines for good practice, which aimed to maximize the child's potential through early intervention (e.g. Dockrell and Messer, 1999; Friel, 1997) .
The fieldwork commenced in the 'Children's Centre', where I spent most of the time observing everyday action (such as meal times and circle times) in the nursery, and occasionally individual therapy sessions. I spent about 9 months observing the 'Children's Centre'. Sometimes I took an opportunity to engage in 'free play' with children, although I mostly remained a 'marginal observer' (Berg, 1995) . I also conducted some video recordings, which allowed for detailed data analysis. Prior to video recordings, I had obtained informed consent from the parents of the children.
There were up to 15 children together per day in the centre. All the children were under 6 years old. They had been diagnosed with a disability that involved a range of physical and cognitive impairments. Due to their impairments, most children in the nursery had little or no speech, and they were receiving speech and language therapy.
In the 'Team Service' setting, I conducted 25 observations over nine months. The assessment team consisted of health, education and welfare professionals, who carried out tests with the children and interviewed their parents. The children who had been referred to the team were under 8.
Although 'communication difficulties' were a frequent reason for the referral, not all the children were diagnosed as disabled or as having 'communication difficulties'. My fieldwork involved observing testing sessions with children as well as meetings where the team would plan the assessments and, in the end, come up with a decision about further intervention. In this setting, I always remained behind a one-way screen between an observation room and two assessment rooms.
The methodological approach and data analysis can be characterized as what Dorothy Smith (2002) calls 'institutional ethnography', with a particular focus on what was 'social' in the two settings. Institutional ethnography begins with particular issues, concerns or problems that are 'real' for the people in the setting. These problems then give direction and focus to the research. For data collection and analysis, I combined ethnomethodological and Foucauldian concerns (Potter, 1996; Silverman, 1987) , focusing on how members put discourses to work as they constitute their social realities. The data extracts, 1 as I intend them to be in this article are descriptive examples of 'passing moments' (Schwandt, 1994) , which I use in order to illustrate the implications of the findings for social research engaged with adult-child communication and the ambiguities that may be involved.
The ambiguity of interpretations
I first encountered the ambiguity of the child's 'voice' in the nursery practice, where it was a direct object of specialist action, including both verbal and non-verbal communication. The 'good practice' ethos in the setting involved attempts to give children 'voices' through acts of choice-making. However, I found that choice-making crystallized certain understandings of communication and the child. Indeed, both verbal and non-verbal interaction in choice-making situations drew on the idea that children are not only entitled to choices but also willing to make them.
The following two extracts describe verbal choice-making during meal times, where children were served a 'three course' meal, and before each round were given options to choose from, such as apple juice or orange juice, or different kinds of pudding:
Eating goes on as usual. At first, 'Sarah' is the only adult who keeps talking to the children, e.g. 'If you don't eat it you will always be as tall as that'. Then two other workers join in -especially 'Tracey' (loudly) and newcomer (quietly): 'Would you like some more? Good boy.' Two workers talk about 'Martin' -they think that he might have chickenpox. 'Robert' is crying -Tracey: 'Enough noise now -you are going to have pudding.' Tracey seems to be in charge of the situation that way. 'Brian' says: 'I would like some custard.' Sarah: 'Well you are allowed to change your mind' (I did not see whether he wanted something else earlier).
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Verbal children would sometimes initiate choice-making, like Brian who wanted 'some custard'. However, verbal choice-making was sometimes quite ambiguous. The next extract describes a situation where the child appeared not to be bothered to make a choice:
A worker says to 'Mike': 'You are looking at this one and pointing at other one Mike. Which one do you want?' Mike says: 'Something', and the worker smiles at me. Tracey did a very quick round with the food items; still, quite a lot of speculation is involved in the choice-making. Children are given 'something', anyhow. Martin still cries quite desperately. A worker asks Mike whether he wants to have apple juice; He replies: 'No no no no -yes!' and the workers laugh at this. Then Mike says something but no one hears it. Eventually the worker brings out the actual food items and he points approximately at the apple juice.
In contrast to the previous examples, I now describe a situation where the child actively 'sent a message' -several times -and faced some mixed responses to it:
This appears to be an educational session. The children are sitting at a table and a worker is teaching them numbers through play. 'Jonathan' is complaining about stomach ache. Worker 1: 'It's nearly lunchtime, you must be hungry.' 'Jerry' knows what to do next. The children are banging the table with sticks really loudly. 'Paula' is not with this at all. She keeps banging the table. She repeats 'tick tock'. Jonathan: 'I need to wee.' Worker 1 says no because he has just been to the toilet. Worker 2 then enters the room, hears this and asks Worker 3 to take him to the toilet.
The children sing a pat-a-cake song with playdoh. The worker explains to me how the children anticipate the events, because they remember them from the previous session. Paula is falling asleep. The others are clapping and messing around -they seem to have fun. Some of them shout rather than sing. Jonathan protests: 'I'm tired'.
As in the extract, in daily nursery work different interpretations of the child's verbal intentions would emerge. Worker 1 interpreted that Jonathan was complaining because he was hungry, but since lunch-time was approaching it was not a problem for the worker. Worker 1 also dismissed Jonathan's request to go to the toilet, whereas the other two workers took notice of this. These sorts of situational judgements of the child's intentions and needs were typical of the nursery practice.
With non-verbal children, the same model of communication was used as with verbal children. Here I describe situations where workers used picture communication symbols (two cards between which the child was expected to choose) as they interacted with children who had little or no speech. An adult asked what a child wanted, and the child's answer was 'retrieved' from eye or hand movements, which were interpreted as pointing at one or the other card with oppositional or alternative meanings.
A worker is using 'yes' and 'no' cards with 'Simon' -a more experienced worker tells the newcomer what hand movement means 'yes' -it is not quite obvious to me. He actually refuses the food by not swallowing it even though
his hand movement is interpreted as having meant 'yes'. The newcomer tells this to the older one. The workers then take turns in using the cards and offering the food. He refuses again and the meal is taken away. The newcomer is still practising with yes/no cards.
What Simon wanted was never clear to either of the workers, but the more senior worker encouraged the newcomer to offer food items to him. There seemed to be a power play -or an educational situation -between two workers of different statuses. The senior worker did not allow the newcomer to 'give up' too easily, in other words, to immediately interpret that the child said 'no' (possibly based on her previous experiences of feeding Simon).
The use of picture cards involved a question-answer model that did not allow children to ask questions or to dismiss the questions asked by workers, who only provided dichotomies, such as 'yes' or 'no', rather than, for example, 'I don't know'. Obviously, there were practical reasons for the simplicity of the cards. On the other hand, the cards, for this particular reason, only facilitated adult-led 'conversation'. This approach also assumed that the child was in the mood for, and capable of, making rational choices.
At its extreme, it appeared that choice-making had become an end in itself so that the adults insisted that the child give an answer. I frequently observed the workers making decisions on behalf of the child when an ambiguous situation arose:
It seems to take quite a long time to feed 'Jemma' (or to teach her to eat by herself) -others have gone through their pudding already. Now she is shown both food items (and a picture card to make the connection). The worker seems to be fed up because Jemma did not look at the 'no' picture card but refused a banana. Another worker says 'I think Jemma likes custard so let's have that'.
The problem is in that one could never be sure exactly what the children wanted until they either swallowed the food or not; by then, they might have changed their minds anyway. Thus, there were no exact means to measure whether the task of giving children a choice was successful on each occasion.
I have suggested that verbal communication in the nursery involved ambiguities, but also that non-verbal communication was often even more obscure. This, I stress again, is not simply a matter of a lack of speech on the part of the child. Instead, the ambiguities arose where non-verbal communication -actually or attempted -was treated according to 'ideal' models for verbal communication. This was inevitably a matter of interpretation.
I have drawn attention to the use of picture communication symbols because they featured in daily practice more frequently than other means of augmentative and alternative communication.
2 In this respect, the use of communication aids was part of what I call 'communication as a medium'. They were material objects intended to replace words or enable the child to express a need or choice, and thereby establish shared understandings between the carer and the child.
I observed two main ambiguities in the use of picture communication symbols. First, as I have argued, their use fundamentally involved ambiguous processes of meaning-making: the hoped-for 'shared understandings' between children and adults in the setting had an accomplished and situational character. This meaning-making was based on a certain logic: it imputed rationality to both adults and children. My analysis questions the feasibility of such logic, first and foremost because it was meant to serve moral-pragmatic purposes. I propose that models for good communication that prefer rational, abstract thinking and action discriminate between different groups of people. I observed this taking place between adults and children, although in the guise of meeting the needs and individual rights of the latter. Second, I observed some ambiguities in how routine practice in the nursery constituted the child as an agent; for example, choice-making situations assumed rational thought and action on the part of the child.
Furthermore, adult-child communication in the nursery fundamentally entailed adult interpretations of the children's meanings. The workers expected the children to learn certain 'fixed' meanings that the adults had applied to words, signs or pictures. I argue that this 'literacy training' assumed face-to-face communication to be something rather linear and straightforward. I also suggest that children were typically encouraged to make choices when it was appropriate in terms of adult frameworks, such as daily timetables. It is possible that meal times may have been one of the few opportunities for the children to initiate their preferences. Nevertheless, in this respect, 'communication' in the nursery was tied to adult judgements about the primary task at hand.
There was often a practical reason for addressing children like in this way, including, for instance, attempts to manage a number of children in a group. After all, it was the adults who had responsibilities over what happened in the setting. I stress that I am not jumping to the simplistic conclusion that choice-making by adults, for example, was inevitably detrimental to the child. This was clear in terms of the child's daily needs, such as being fed. I am rather noting that the expectation of the child to be an active and purposeful choice-maker has implications for perceptions of the child as a communicator.
These sorts of ambiguities also emerged in the second research setting. The 'Team Service' work involved objects, such as toys, texts or pictures, the use of which had specific meanings and purposes for the practitioners. My analysis suggests that these test 'tools' were structured and that they constituted particular kinds of frames for interaction. The logic of testing overlooked the complexities and ambiguities of meaning-making, and the child's potential for behaving agentically. These points are illustrated in the following extract, which describes speech and language assessment, and suggests how children may interpret the practitioners' questions in various, imaginative and sometimes surprising ways: The SLT seems to be rushing, looking at the clock and moving forward fast. She then asks Daniel to explain pictures on cards -he does not recognize all of them and the SLT shows the same cards a few times. Daniel starts imitating her: 'We'll go back to that one'. The SLT carries on: 'How are a man and a dog different?' D: 'Because human and a pet are the right answers'.
The speech and language therapist's task was to sort out the 'correct' answers from incorrect ones, based on her interpretation of whether the child had comprehended the question. Interestingly, this time she was allowed to ask the same question more than once; on some other occasions, the professional requirement for standardization had prevented this.
Thus, meaning-making was a complex activity, both verbally and nonverbally. Sometimes the practitioners expressed their awareness of this to me, as in the following extract.
'Jeremy' is spotting 'mistakes' in practitioner's pictures -he laughs when a person in the picture puts food in the washing machine and not in the oven. Meanwhile, another practitioner in the observation room talks about his enunciation, which seems to be the problem, not comprehension (he starts words with the letter D). This practitioner is convinced that the Team members are 'tuned in to understand' what the child says (when I was wondering whether the parents would understand him). Still they all keep saying, every once in a while, that they don't understand a word that Jeremy is saying during the test. One practitioner says that when she did a test, she just nodded to pretend that she was following him.
It seemed obvious that Jeremy did not have any problems with understanding the intended jokes in the pictures. However, I was having trouble with understanding his speech and I said this to the practitioners who were in the observation room. I then asked whether anyone else could make any sense of it. One practitioner said that as experts they are 'tuned in' to understand the child; another said that she pretended to understand in order to carry on with the assessment.
In sum, the second setting manifested the same themes as the first: specialists' preferences for symbolic communication, expectations of rational thought and action on the part of the child, practical difficulty of interpretation, and the rules and recommendations for 'good' adult practice, which framed adult-child interaction. In light of this, fundamental moralpragmatic and epistemological questions arose in terms of my research ques-
tions. What could I make of the child's 'voice' as an object of enquiry? Could I position the child as a straightforward 'speaking subject' in these circumstances? If not, what kind of approach would be an epistemologically and ethically sound alternative?
The discourse of children's rights emphasizes the message that children should be listened to by adults who make decisions concerning their lives, which involves research on/with children. Yet, I repeat: What are children's 'voices' and how should we listen to them (Davis, 1998) ? Since fundamental epistemological and moral-pragmatic questions significantly affected every stage of the research process, I now reflect on the uncertainties that arose from the fieldwork experience.
Reflections on the ambiguities in the practices of research
My experiences in these settings led me to recognize the need for 'reflexivity' in research in terms of three different areas. First, in the context of research methods and ethics 'reflexivity' typically refers to the relationship between the knower and the known, with attention to hierarchies, 'good' and 'bad' research, and the normatively constituted speaking positions (Adkins, 2002) . Second, reflexivity in my research had to do with the dichotomy between realism and anti-realism in social constructionist research. By this I refer to the problem of using realist methods and then giving reflexive accounts of the data (Coffey, 2002) . Third, I link reflexivity to the ambiguity of the researcher's role as an actor in disability/childhood settings. These interrelated three areas constituted an epistemological and moral-pragmatic dilemma for me in terms of the child's 'voice' and its place in ethnographic research practice.
For Coffey (2002) , ethnographic writing has a biographical dimension in that ethnographers are concerned with observing, reconstructing and writing the lives and experiences of Others. In the field, I at first tried to use 'realist' methods to capture 'social constructions' and soon figured that this was not a balanced approach. This is because, although the research used social constructionism for the analysis of the Other, my initial observations were based on 'realist' principles. Eventually, I made it clear to myself and others that I could not regard certain things (such as children communicating about their wishes) as 'real' and others as constructed (such as the concepts of 'childhood' and 'disability').
For Mauthner and Doucet (2003) , this kind of ambiguity stems from the inseparability of epistemology, ontology and research practice. In the beginning, I assumed I would be representing other people, and would thereby be able to distinguish my own 'voice' as a researcher from their voices as research subjects. Gradually, I had to come to terms with the fact that I was not representing the voices of either children or adult actors in the settings; instead I ended up deconstructing the notion of 'voice' altogether. Having taken on postmodern and poststructuralist writers' rejection of the authorial 'voice', and the deconstruction of 'truths' (Barthes, 1974; Geertz, 1988; Lyotard, 1994) , I struggled with the crisis of representation in ethnographic writing.
I also discovered ambiguities in the idea of 'bridging the gap' between adult researchers and children's worlds in terms of the researcher's role. Mandell (1991) , for instance, has suggested that adults who research children's lives should avoid authoritarian or patronizing attitudes towards children. Others have emphasized the need to engage children in research as equal participants (e.g. Beresford, 1997 ). Yet, these suggestions did not seem to be helpful to my research project. Where to go from here?
Discussion

Disabled and able-bodied children's 'voices' in social research
For Aitken and Millar (2002) , the last two decades or so in the UK have witnessed the rise of a 'culture of consultation'. This means that individuals are increasingly being supported to make their own decisions rather than having others make decisions for them. Notions such as 'personal choice' and 'control' now lie at the core of developments in services and opportunities. Increasingly, there have been campaigns to support disabled people as well, in order to have their views listened to and acted on. Aitken and Millar argue that as these cultural changes spread it was only a matter of time before the effects would begin to be seen in various practices, including social research with children.
I have found that within the so-called 'child-centred' discourse in childhood sociology, children are often granted an individualistic status as subjects/agents and as intentional beings, whose 'voices' may remain unheard because of the 'tyranny' of developmental perspectives over their lives. Previously, Lee has also referred to the ambiguity of childhood sociology and the construction of the child's 'subjecthood' in this fashion:
As sociologists of childhood have attempted to bring children into sociological focus in their own right, the disciplinary concern with the 'complete' has required that children be attributed the properties assumed more normally to belong to adults. The sociology of childhood has thus preserved the privilege of the complete and the mature over the incomplete and immature. (Lee, 1999: 458) Furthermore, in the child protection context, Lee (2000) has observed a shift from the body to the 'voice'. This shift is similar to the shift promoted within disability studies, where the goal is to achieve societal change and enhance disabled people's rights (e.g. Marks, 1999) .
At the same time, it has been argued that (disabled) children's needs and rights are also social constructs and that these constructs are interrelated and often contradictory (e.g. Doyal and Gough, 1991) . For Woodhead
K O M U L A I N E N : T H E A M B I G U I T Y O F T H E C H I L D ' S ' V O I C E '
(1997), conceptualizing 'childhood' in terms of 'needs' reflects the distinctive status accorded to young humanity in contemporary western societies. It is commonplace to regard the needs-led approach as a progressive and enlightened framework for working with children, by contrast with former times and other societies. Nevertheless, the concept of 'need' conceals in practice a complex of latent cultural and personal assumptions and judgements about children, which are not attributable to children's 'innate' nature as such.
In light of this, positioning disabled children as morally 'deserving' actors with marginalized 'voices' becomes problematic. Actually, it may be pointed out that many accounts of disabled childhoods often appear rather pessimistic (Barnes et al., 2000) . For instance, protectionist arguments continue to construe disabled children as vulnerable victims, and typically deemphasize the 'other side of the story'. An example of an optimistic account could be the following: 3 Disabled children, even those with the most severe impairments, are able to communicate their feelings about their lives and the treatment which they receive. Disabled children are not passive victims -many are happy and feel successful. (Barnes et al., 2000: 1-4) To take the argument further: child welfare and sociological discourses that are referred to in this article may be associated with the general societal trend, where children -disabled and able-bodied -have become a moral project. As for James et al.:
Children have become supremely an issue of our time. Nations are investing in educational and moral futures and public concerns abound with issues of protection, rights, and citizenship in relation to the young. It is all too easy to become embroiled in the urgent hyperbole of paedophilia, child abuse, child pornography, childhood criminality or even the perpetual party political battle ground of educational standards: they are all 'the' issues of today and appear to require an immediate answer, or at least an opinion. (James et al., 1998: 197) I see my research project and the two research settings as being at the heart of this contemporary discourse, which manifests itself in moral-pragmatic justifications and political rhetoric and action. What is important here, as I agree with James et al. (1998) , is that in sociology, we need to consider this urgent focus on children analytically. I argue that the analysis of children's 'voices' must include considerations of the dynamics of human communication and interaction. Young children with little or no speech might make the most striking example of ambiguous communication -yet I suggest all adult-child encounters entail ambiguities. In principle I agree with the call for appreciating children's views on issues that affect their lives; yet I caution against too simplistic and/or sensationalized a usage of the term 'voice'. I have observed certain dominant discourses on human communication manifesting themselves in childcare practice, for example, in the use of picture communication symbols. I argue that practices like this constitute the child's 'voice' as an object that can be possessed, retrieved and verbalized. To reiterate: the argument in this article is that ideals of 'normal' and good communication that prefer rational, abstract thinking and action discriminate between different groups of people even though the aim were to meet the needs and individual rights of children. Thus I argue that the so-called 'culture of consultation' involves many controversies, in particular when 'extended' to young disabled children by virtue of legal-ethical obligations.
One set of criticisms of the commonplace understandings of the child's 'voice' has to do with its individualizing character. The view that the 'mind' is the site, origin and definition of purposive human action shapes cognitivist approaches to communication, and is a long-standing tradition in the western world. This idea is sometimes referred to as a 'mentalistic' approach, in which communication is a matter of mental representations, internal states or mental concepts (Finnegan, 2002) .
In contrast, drawing on the Bakhtinian perspective, I suggest the notions of 'mutuality' and 'multivoicedness' as alternatives to a unitary, atomistic understanding of an individual's 'voice' (Wertsch, 1991) . Bakhtin's dialogical model focuses on 'utterances', which are produced by a 'voice', a point of view. However, for Bakhtin, 'voices' are processes rather than locations: they never exist in social isolation. 'Meanings' come into existence when two or more voices come into contact: there has to be a speaker and a listener, an 'addresser' and 'addressee', and there will also be multiple voices and 'multivoicedness' (Wertsch, 1991) . In the Bakhtinian perspective, interpersonal communication can never be fail-safe. Hence, the frequent misunderstandings in human interactions are probably attributable to unfounded assumptions of mutuality (Graumann, 1995) .
In a similar vein, in the context of disability, for Moser and Law (2001) , the paradox of 'giving someone a voice' is that voices do not exist in isolation; they don't simply reflect something that is pre-existing. Giving 'voices' may involve the risk of limiting articulation to that which is verbal, textual or linguistic. In the context of the 'communication difficulties' of young disabled children, 'voices' that are non-verbal are simply not recognized or are disqualified, even though, sometimes, physical movements (actions) and noises are obviously more important than the use of words.
'Voices' as outcomes of communication processes can also be deconstructed on a wider discursive level. Durham Peters (1999) has insightfully suggested that, in western countries, 'communication' has become central to reflections on democracy, love and our changing times. His question is why such a rich meaning is attached to communication. For Durham Peters, the so-called therapeutic discourses perceive the alleged components of 'good communication' -understanding, cooperation, community or love -as genuine human goods. However, the attainment of these goods tends to overlook the circumstantial character of human communication. For example, too often the label 'failing to communicate' might be attached to persons when they are actually opting out of the game. In this regard, discourses on communication are essentially moral in character.
An inevitable ambiguity arises when communication becomes disembodied from interaction. However, contextualist approaches to communication incorporate the notion of 'social construction'. What they have in common is the interactionist perspective on language and communication where the focus is on the 'communicative act' (Farr and Rommetveit, 1995) : the meaning of an act is in the nature of the response it elicits from others. I therefore argue that the child's 'voice' as a concept is a social construction.
What can be done?
My solution to the aforementioned ambiguities involved in the research project drew on Smith (2002) : the object of my study was what the actors in the setting treated as 'real'. My knowledge claims of their realities would be presented as constructions, which can be read in differing ways by different audiences. Denzin has described a situation like this a 'messy moment' in ethnographic writing: the texts consist of a 'cacophony of voices speaking with various agendas' (Coffey, 2002: 314-16 ). However, I reassured myself that this inevitable 'polyvocality' need not necessarily be associated with unethical research conduct.
The same idea applied to my role as a researcher: there was not one role but many, and they could not necessarily be predetermined. I only learned what roles were comfortable for me in the field once I had spent some time in the two settings, where I gained experience of being both a detached and a participant observer. In the end, I preferred being a detached observer, since I did not see how my participation would have benefited the children or advanced this research. On the other hand, I argue that, as the alternative to the inclusion of children's 'voices' in this research, I did something else that is equally valuable: I described observable action that has significant consequences to the lives of young children.
During and after the fieldwork phase, I wanted the research to be not
just fundamentally guided by but also reflexive about moral values and choices. To reiterate: in terms of research ethics, my definition of 'reality' is based on Smith's (2002) suggestion -what is real to the subjects is what matters. My access to the realities of children (with or without communication difficulties) was limited in both settings. What I know about it has been, for the most part, mediated by adults; children's participation has not been fundamental to this research. However, that mediated knowledge was sufficient enough to convince me that the purpose of this research -to develop new understandings of children's communication -is ethically sound.
Conclusion
In this article I have questioned a particular version of a young (disabled or able-bodied) child's 'voice'. This version assumes a rational, autonomous 'agent' as an intentional subject -a notion linked to a wider individualization process in the western world. Recognizing and accounting for children's 'voices' presumes rational action on the part of the speaker. This perspective has the moral goal of giving rights to children; yet, when not clarified, it may dismiss the complexity of communication as a local interactional activity. I wanted to draw particular attention to the epistemology, ontology and practice of qualitative research. This is particularly important in research that encourages the participation of children in the generation of data. In my research I came to see the multifaceted ambiguity of the idea of 'listening to children'. This recognition undermined the implicit or explicit assumptions in the so-called child-centred research, which takes for granted that children have message-like thoughts that can be exchanged, and intentions that match the situations defined by adults; and that these can be researched in an ethical fashion (Alderson, 1995) . My findings in two specialist settings have indicated that ethical and epistemological considerations are more complex than that. Studying children's lives in the contemporary world is inevitably political. It can be argued, though, that care has to be taken to distinguish rhetoric from practice. For Roberts (2000) , listening to children is not necessarily 'good' but may be, in fact, intrusive and the cause of further distress: more listening may not inevitably mean more hearing. In other words, researchers should think about when and how to conduct research with children so that it is as ethical as they claim it to be. Therefore, since listening to children is not a straightforward thing to do, judgements of need and harm remain contextual to a certain extent (Morrow and Richards, 1996) . Decisions need to be made about whether children want to talk if they can -is it really always 'good to talk?' As far as I am concerned, the contemporary, presumably 'child-centred' discourse on listening tends to advocate the Freudian type 'talking cure' (Cameron, 2000) ,
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and does not take into account the possibly harmful effects of 'having to talk'. At the end of the day, just as in child welfare practice, social researchers initiate communicative events with children, and research styles and purposes frame the subsequent adult-child communication.
Moreover, the question arises whether 'listening to children' in social research is an empowering or a rhetorical device. Is it simply one that attempts to furnish young children with a western value of competence, while at the same time, paradoxically, purporting to undermine hegemonic notions of a 'skill'? For Prout (2000) , the observation that children can exercise agency should be a point of analytical embarkation and not a terminus. In other words, merely replacing one essentialist argument (that children are incompetent) with another (that they are competent) appears unsatisfactory. It is possible that children can be, at the same time, vulnerable and competent; however, their positioning in this respect tends to be in the hands of adults.
I have offered reflexivity as a strategy for ensuring ethical research conduct. By this I stress the recognition of the adult mediation and construction of children's 'voices', both on local and wider discursive levels. This might involve reflecting on not simply what one 'hears' as a researcher, but on what one expects to hear, and how these expectations may frame the dynamics of adult-child interaction.
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1.
The names for children and staff in data extracts are pseudonyms. Practitioners are generally referred to as 'she'. 2.
Alternative and augmentative communication (AAC) means any method of communicating that supplements the ordinary methods of speech and handwriting, where these are impaired (Millar and Scott, 2001 ). Most AAC users use a mixture of unaided (such as signing) and aided communication (physical objects such as symbol charts or books), and a mixture of low tech and high tech aids, depending on the situation.
3.
See also Komulainen (2005) .
4.
This argument has implications to research on adult voices as well; however, I feel that a fair treatment of this dimension is beyond the scope of this article.
